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I. INTRODUCTION
Hazardous waste disposal facilities are necessary evils. Most people
would prefer that such facilities be sited somewhere other than their
proverbial backyard.' Only a few potential hazardous waste disposal
sites can be eliminated from consideration on the basis of uncontrov-
ersially neutral "technical" criteria. 2 Whatever the present3 or future
federal regulatory scheme, the inevitable question will be: upon what
grounds may area residents or a local or state government object to or
restrict the siting or operation of a hazardous waste disposal facility?
In particular, this article examines the two most interesting grounds
for local objection to the siting of hazardous waste disposal facilities.
The first objection is the claim that the residents of a particular state
or locality are, through one process or another, bearing disproportionate
burdens of hazardous waste disposal. The argument is that other waste-
producing states are evading their responsibilities, to the detriment of
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
1. William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not In My Backyard" Syndrome: An Approach to
Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to the Siting of PCB Disposal Facilities, 63
N.C. L. Rv. 811, 812-13 (1985); Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local
Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HAzv. ENvrL. L. Rv.
265, 266-69 (1982); Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive
Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 437, 438 (1988); Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a
National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L. Rav. 198, 198-204 (1990); Alan L. Farkas, Over-
coming Public Opposition to the Establishment of New Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 9 CAP.
U. L. REv. 450, 450-51 (1980); A. Dan Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State
Control of Hazardous-Waste Facility Location, 14 LAND UsE & ENvTL. L. Rav. 533, 534-35
(1983).
2. The range of potential hazardous waste sites is broad; only a limited number of areas
can be disqualified on "neutral" considerations of geography and geology, or hydrology. See,
e.g., Andreen, supra note 1, at 834.
3. Among the major current federal regulatory statutes are the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(d) (1988); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, id. §§
6901-6991; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, id. §§
9601-9657; and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, id. §§ 10101-10226.
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residents of the site state. In particular, the siting decision raises the
risk of stigmatic injury to the receiving state.
The most obvious response is that apart from the changing features
of any relevant federal regulatory scheme 4 the "dormant" or "nega-
tive" Commerce Clause, among other arguably relevant constitutional
provisions, 5 sets crucial limits on state prohibition of, taxation of, or
other restrictions on the receipt of out-of-state hazardous waste. The
strength of this "stigmatic injury" objection, therefore, depends upon
the purposes at stake in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
theory of the dormant Commerce Clause is surprisingly receptive, in
appropriate instances, to local or state governmentally imposed barriers
to the importing and disposal of hazardous wastes generated out of
state.
The second objection to local siting of hazardous waste disposal
facilities is even more interesting, because it is both subject to more
precise empirical investigation and even more deeply rooted in contem-
porary constitutional values. Hazardous waste facility siting has had a
predictably disproportionate adverse impact upon rural areas and upon
the poor and politically unorganized. 6 Even more dramatically, the
uncompensated risks and costs of hazardous waste disposal sites may
fall upon racial and ethnic minorities in proportions far beyond that
which can be accounted for by random chance. 7 While no single
authority makes such siting decisions, and while it is unclear to what
extent the disproportionate burdening of racial and ethnic minorities is
consciously intended, the stark pattern of overall disproportionate net
burdening of minorities is unmistakable. At that point, some form of
redress under the Equal Protection Clause is appropriate. This article
explores some of the most crucial evidence and some of the constitu-
tional issues associated with equal protection-based constraints on haz-
ardous waste facility siting.
II. THE LOCAL BURDENS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE DisposAL FACILITIES
Notoriously, communities seldom clamor for the local construction
of hazardous waste disposal facilities. 9 Such local opposition is not
4. See id. §§ 2021(b)-(d), 6901-6991, 9601-9657, 10101-10226.
5. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. The Commerce Clause, binding the states in
its "dormant" aspect, grants Congress power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several
States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. See infra notes 37-119 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
8. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
9. See supra note 1.
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usually completely irrational. Of course, the development of a hazardous
waste disposal facility will ordinarily involve genuine local benefits,
such as increased employment and an enhanced property tax base. 10
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that most hazardous waste disposal
siting attempts are frustrated by local opposition," and that states
typically do not develop such sites on a scale commensurate with the
national need. 12
Among the major perceived or actual local costs, of course, are the
enhanced risks to health and to the local environment. 3 There may
also follow reduced local property values, noxious fumes, and even the
attraction of hazardous waste-generating industry. 4 Local benefits, such
as new employment and increased tax revenues, tend to be surprisingly
modest." As Professor Dan Tarlock has observed, "[h]azardous-waste
management facilities are capital-rather than labor-intensive and gen-
erally do not offer much of a tax bonanza to local communities.' ' 6
Importantly, the costs and benefits of the hazardous waste facility
often are not internalized or captured, as the case may be, by their
creator. This casts further doubt on the economic rationality of the
siting decisions. Health risks created by the site, for example, are hardly
confined to employees or other persons in contractual privity with the
siteowners; the long-term health of the surrounding community may be
jeopardized. 7 The environmental benefits of the site, in concentrating
hazardous waste in a single locality, extend far beyond the surrounding
community.'" Entire geographic regions may benefit from a cleaner
environment without providing compensation for, or otherwise helping
to defray, the localized social costs of the disposal site. 19 In sum,
hazardous waste sites generate substantial positive and negative exter-
nalities to largely separate groups of people. There is little reason to
10. See Brion, supra note 1, at 450.
11. See Karen Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or
Confusion?, 6 HA~v. ENVmL. L. REv. 307, 308 (1982).
12. See William A. Campbell, State Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: A
Technique for Excluding Out-Of-State Wastes?, 14 ENvTL. L. 177, 179 (1983).
13. See. e.g., David Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1309, 1332 (1989).
14. See Susan G. Hadden et al., State Roles in Siting Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities:
From State Preemption to Local Veto, in Tm POLMCS OF HAZARDOUS WAsTE MANAGEMENT 196,
197 (James P. Lester & Ann O'M. Bowman eds., 1983).
15. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 268-69.
16. Tarlock, supra note 1, at 544.
17. See, e.g., Florini, supra note 11, at 325.
18. See Hadden, et al., supra note 14, at 196; Florini, supra note 11, at 325-27.
19. See Florini, supra note 11, at 325-27.
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imagine that the number and operation of such sites reflect any broad
social rationality.
Local and state opposition to hazardous waste site construction, or
to such site's acceptance of any and all hazardous waste from all
sources, takes a variety of forms. A state or locality may, of course,
seek to prevent the construction of the site. Failing that, a state or
locality may, depending upon the nature of its grievance, bar the
importation of non-local hazardous waste.2' Less drastically, a state
may attempt to restrict the importation of out-of-state hazardous waste
based on reciprocity-of-rights grounds, 2' hardship, capacity-limit con-
siderations,2 or by reference to participation in interstate waste-disposal
compacts .23
Each of these restrictions may be combined with some form of
exclusive or nonexclusive government ownership, or government oper-
ation, of the hazardous waste facilities. Some form of government
ownership of waste-disposal facilities in general is common.2 This is
important, in our context, in that it might be argued that governments
20. See Andreen, supra note 1, at 833-34; Pomper, supra note 13, at 1337; Jonathan R.
Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State Hazardous Waste Import Bans,
15 CoLum. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1990). Among the illustrative cases are J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v.
New Jersey, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988); Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist.,
820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); County of Washington v. Casella Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 90-CV-
513, 1990 WL 208709 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1990); Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't
Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990); In re Fiorillo Bros., 577 A.2d 1316 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
21. See, e.g., Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264, 1265-67 (10th Cir. 1978) (relying on the
Court's intervening decision in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), the
Hardage court reversed the lower court's holding that a reciprocity statute restricting the impor-
tation of industrial waste did not violate the Commerce Clause because the waste was not an
article of commerce).
22. See, e.g., Casella Waste Mgmt., 1990 WL 208709, at *1; Borough of Glassboro v.
Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 485 A.2d 299, 302 (N.J. 1984).
23. See, e.g., National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't Envtl. Mgmt., 910 F.2d
713, 717 (1lth Cir. 1990), modified on denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (1991); Florini, supra note
11, at 334-35. But see Hunt v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 1901043, 1991 WL 151546, at
*20 (Ala. July 11, 1991). In Hunt, the Alabama Supreme Court openly questioned the Eleventh
Circuit's conclusion in National Solid Wastes that hazardous waste was an article of commerce.
Id. Even if the Eleventh Circuit was correct, the Hunt court concluded that an additional fee
imposed solely upon imported hazardous waste did not violate the Commerce Clause. Id. The
court's decision was based on a legislative finding that the additional fee was an effective way to
deal with the health and environmental hazards associated with the disposal of hazardous waste.
Id.
24. See, e.g., Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (D.R.I. 1987); Shayne
Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984); County Comm'rs
of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 16-22 (Md. 1984); Hadden et al., supra note 14, at
202; Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 95 DiCK. L. Rav. 131,
133 nn.15-16 (1990).
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have broader discretion in restricting interstate commerce in the flow
of wastes through state-owned facilities than through privately owned
facilities. 25 It has been argued, for example, that absent congressional
preemption or other prohibition, "if New Jersey wants its landfill space
to be used only to dispose of New Jersey waste, it may accomplish this
by purchasing the privately-owned landfills through its eminent domain
power, and then limiting their use." Of course, such exclusion of out-
of-state waste from state-owned disposal sites is no less a discriminatory
burden on interstate commerce than exclusion from privately-owned
sites, especially if the government holds a monopoly on such sites. 27
On some accounts, state ownership of the waste disposal site should
not bar courts from determining whether the state's policy regarding
foreign access to the site impermissibly restricts the flow of interstate
commerce. 2
Under appropriate circumstances, perfectly legitimate and constitu-
tionally justified reasons exist for states or localities to reject the
construction of hazardous waste sites, or to restrict the operation or
utilization of such sites, on broadly equitable or "political," as opposed
to narrowly technical, grounds. But the arguments advanced below do
not rely upon state investment in, or ownership of, the site, or what
is otherwise known as the "market-participant" exemption29 from the
constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Whatever its precise contours or ultimate fate, the "market-partici-
pant" doctrine in this context would mean that the residents of a
25. Among the recent cases, perhaps the most valuable discussion is contained in Swin
Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa., 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1127 (1990). For discussions citing much of the broadly relevant case law in a variety of
contexts, see Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause,
and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REv. 71 (1980); Campbell, supra note 12; Pomper, supra
note 13; A. Dan Tarlock, So It's Not "Ours"-Why Can't We Still Keep It? A First Look at
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18 LAND & WATER L. REv. 137 (1983).
26. Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause As a Restriction on State Regulation
and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 1026
(1985).
27. See Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 25, at 90.
28. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 12, at 185.
29. For the chronology of the United States Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence of the
state as a "market participant," see South Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82
(1984); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Sporhase
v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The Court raised in dicta, but did not resolve, the
question of whether a state-owned waste disposal site would be immune from dormant Commerce
Clause restrictions, under the "market-participant" exemption, in the leading case of City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978); see also Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District
of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1131-34 (D.D.C. 1984) (discussing and applying the market-
participant exemption in a solid waste disposal case).
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governmental unit who have invested or sacrificed to produce a partic-
ular good or service, such as a waste disposal facility, should be entitled
to exclude non-contributing outsiders from the use of that particular
good or service. The basic idea would be that the government's creation
or development of a valuable good or service justifies far broader rights
to control its use or disposition, than if the government were merely
regulating, for public interest purposes, the use or disposition of a
privately developed good or service.30
Any version of the market-participant exemption is deeply problem-
atic. Doctrinally, there is some argument for the view that the United
States Supreme Court effectively overruled the cases supporting the
exemption in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.3l
On such a view, the distinction between creating and regulating wealth
is entitled to no more constitutional respect than the distinction between
presumptively immune traditional or integral governmental functions
and other governmental functions abandoned in Garcia.32
The distinction between government development of a good or service
and government regulation of the private development of that good or
service is simply too murky in the relevant cases. One could argue,
certainly, that the government does not sacrifice or invest to create a
site that is technically safe and appropriate for use as a hazardous
waste disposal facility; such a site is simply a natural resource. 33 Of
course, someone must transform the site from a raw geological for-
mation into a functioning artificial landfill. But even the most purely
privately-owned disposal facilities will typically have received some
public expenditure benefit, if only with respect to the security of the
site. Why should the state not be able to control the site's waste
acceptance policy to an extent commensurate with the state's contri-
bution to the physical or financial viability of the private waste-disposal
operation?
The deeper problem, though, is why any sort of public investment
in or assistance to the development of a hazardous waste disposal site
30. See White, 460 U.S. at 208; Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa., 883
F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990); Sedler, supra note 26, at 1015;
see also Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 88 MIcH. L. Rav. 395, 441 (1989) (discussing the fairness of allowing state citizens "to
reap where they have sown"). Contrast the opposing result in right-to-travel cases such as Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
31. 469 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1985).
32. See Swin Resource, 883 F.2d at 261-62 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting); Karl Manheim, New
Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 Amiz. ST. L.J. 559, 562 (1990).
33. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443-44 (citing City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, for the
proposition that a landfill, unlike cement, is a natural resource); Florini, supra note 11, at 333.
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should entitle the state to control access to the developed site in ways
arguably injurious to outsiders, especially where it is difficult for
outsiders to develop alternatives to the disposal site in question.14
Suppose a state had exercised the industry and foresight necessary to
develop the only practicable source of water for an entire region, and
that, as is the case, no close substitutes for water exist. Does that state
have the moral right, if it so chooses, to not only set a high price for
the water, but to flatly prohibit its sale, directly or indirectly, to
outsiders?
Doubtless, prudence suggests that we accord the public or private
developer of the resource substantial control over the economic proceeds
of the developed resource, lest we impair the incentive to develop the
resource in the first place.3 But there is no reason to suppose, in
general, that resources will remain underdeveloped if the developer of
the resource is rewarded in some fashion other than a right to exclude
willing, paying customers on grounds of their out-of-state status.
Admittedly, there is a distinguished pedigree for the idea that appro-
priating or developing a resource before others do so morally entitles
the developer to broad rights to control access to that resource.3 6 But
there are obvious moral limits to the scope of the developer's rights to
restrict access to that resource, even where the developer has not
prevented others from developing alternatives, and even where no
rejected customer would have had access to the resource if the developer
of the resource had never existed. The foresight and exertion of a
public or private developer does not necessarily entitle the developer to
impose disproportionate suffering on others through restricting access
34. Cf. Campbell, supra note 12, at 187 ("It seems likely that some states will have no
suitable landfill sites for the disposal of hazardous and low-level radioactive wastes."). But cf.
Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (D.R.I. 1987) (several applications pending
to construct alternative disposal facilities in Rhode Island); Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D. Or. 1986) ("[N]othing prevents private
operators from purchasing land in the District and developing it for landfill."). For the view that
the commercial impact of state restrictions will tend to be more serious where the state holds a
monopoly in the supply of the service in question, see Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 25, at
90.
35. See, e.g., Pomper, supra note 13, at 1321.
36. The classic argument is found in JoHN LocKE, Two TEATIsss OF GOVERNMENT, 305-06
(Peter Laslett ed., 1967) (1698). For a penetrating criticism of Locke's theory in this respect, see
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 174-82 (1974). Nozick's own distinctively libertarian
approach to the breadth and strength of property rights is in turn trenchantly criticized in several
of the essays contained in RAvnDIo NOZICK: EssAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Jeffrey
Paul ed., 1981). For both an exposition of the relation between Locke's approach and Nozick's,
and an effective critique of the latter, see Virginia Held, John Locke on Robert Nozick, 43 Soc.
Ras. 169 (1976).
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to the resource. Just as there are moral limits to the right of the
discoverer or developer of the sole oasis to prevent the thirsty from
drinking within a hundred miles of the oasis, so there may be moral
limits to a state's right to restrict access of out-of-staters to a hazardous
waste disposal site developed by the state, especially where no compa-
rable waste disposal sites are available to others, through no fault of
their own.
Thus, for a variety of reasons, the market-participant doctrine does
not provide a sound, convincing justification for governmental restric-
tions on out-of-state access to hazardous waste disposal facilities. More
promising grounds exist, however, for a state substantially restricting
the importation of hazardous waste, as we shall see below.
III. RESTRICTING THE INTERSTATE MOVEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF
HAzARDOUs WASTE: STIGMA, THE SOCIAL BASES OF SELF-RESPECT, AND
THE VALUE OF NATIONAL UNION
A particularly interesting theme recurs sporadically throughout dis-
cussions of state or local restrictions on the siting or exploitation of
hazardous waste disposal facilities. Fear is sometimes expressed, not of
the health risks or costs of the facility and its operation, but of the
state becoming, or becoming perceived as, "the dumping ground" for
a geographical region or for the entire nation.37
Doubtless, the "dumping ground for the nation" concern does not
exhaust a state or locality's motivation in restricting the siting or
operation of hazardous waste facilities. Indeed, in some cases, it may
be difficult to tell where this concern ends, and others, such as safety
and environmental concerns, regional isolationism, or a selfishly irre-
sponsible shirking of responsibilities begin.3 8 Nevertheless, the sense of
indignity, exploitation, and disproportionate burdening underlying the
"dumping ground" concern is in principle distinguishable, and, de-
37. See, e.g., Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 745
(S.D. Ind. 1990) (Bayh I) (Governor Bayh as candidate seeking "to ensure that Indiana did not
become the dumping-ground of trash from the East Coast"); National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n
v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 729 F. Supp. 792, 804 (N.D. Ala.) (aim of Alabama statute
"to prevent Alabama from becoming the dumping ground for those states that refuse to 'clean
up their act' under federal law") rev'd, 910 F.2d 713 (lth Cir. 1990), modified on denial of
reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (1991); Harvey Lieber, Federalism and Hazardous Waste Policy, in Tan
PoL.mcs oF HAZARDOUS WAsTm MANAoEENT 68 (James P. Lester & Ann O'M. Bowman eds.,
1983) (quoting an Arkansas resident complaining that "[wie feel we are a dumping ground for
the entire country").
38. See, e.g., Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853, 856
(S.D. Ind. 1990) (Bayh 1) ("The simple truth is that no one wants to live near a landfill with the
accompanying odors, fleets of garbage trucks, and pollution.").
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pending upon the particular circumstances of each case, may be justi-
fied.
Being, or being perceived as, the region or nation's "dumping ground"
is thus a very real, if quite intangible, sort of injury. The injury may
properly be referred to as stigmatic in character.39 Stigmatic injuries
are not necessarily morally or constitutionally trivial. 4° Stigmatic injuries
in the context of hazardous waste siting decisions in part go, to one
degree or another, to the social bases for individual self-respect and to
individual dignity. That is to say, stigmatic injuries are actions or
decisions of others tending in part to undermine the material or insti-
tutional grounds on which we found our self-respect. To some extent,
our self-respect ordinarily depends upon being respected, in some rel-
evant sense, by other people. 4' To the extent that stigmatic injuries
implicate the social bases of self-respect, or that they undermine the
dignity of the injured parties, they may be among the most fundamental
breaches of social justice.4 2
This is not to suggest that moral theory or the Constitution guarantees
against all personal slights, or that we are all legally entitled to think
well of ourselves. But there are plainly instances, actual or imaginable,
in which a broad federal policy intentionally or unintentionally results
in serious stigmatic injury to a group of persons in such a way as to
call for rfioral redress, if not for legal redress via the Equal Protection
Clause. 43
In particular, there is some tension between the Equal Protection
Clause, on the one hand, and the unfettered flow of commerce on the
39. See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 1, at 812 n.6, 814 & n.10 (referring particularly to PCB
disposal sites); Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 268 (referring to "the stigma associated with
being labelled 'the region's dump').
40. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (stigmatic injury as among the most
serious consequences of governmental discrimination on the basis of race).
41. See, e.g., JomH RAWLS, A THEoRy op JusncE 338, 440, 544-45 (1971); Wayne Proudfoot,
Rawls on Self-Respect and Social Union, 5 J. Cm E pint. 255, 257-58 (1978); see also Charles
C. Ardinger, Self-Respect and the Original Position, 30 DiA.oouE 17, 17 (1987) (self-respect as
supported, in Rawls' view, by the appreciation of other people).
42. See RAwIS, supra note 41, at 440; Proudfoot, supra note 41, at 256 (expounding Rawis'
view). For a central focus on dignity, see Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional
Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 703 (1980). For a brief discussion of the linkage between self-respect,
respect by others, and human dignity, see Robert F. Lane, Should Government Be Concerned
With Self-Esteem?, 10 PoL. THEoRY 5, 6 (1982). For discussions of some of the multiple senses
of the ideas of respect and self-respect, see Bernard R. Boxill, Self-Respect and Protest, 6 Pm..
& PuB. An'. 58 (1976); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Servility and Self-Respect, 57 MONIsT 87 (1973);
Stephen J. Massey, Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?, 93 ETMcs 246"(1973);
Elizabeth Telfer, Self-Respect, 18 Pan. Q. 114 (1968).
43. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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other. Doubtless, the geographic distribution of hazardous waste dis-
posal facilities is, in some sense, the result of numerous independent,
uncoordinated decisions by many people, including private parties.
Governments are generally not responsible for the actions of private
parties." Whether the decisions resulting in the siting of hazardous
waste facilities really amount only to the constitutionally neutral, un-
tainted, pre-political operation of a purely private marketplace is,
however, extremely doubtful.45
In any event, judicial application of the Commerce Clause may
involve the courts giving binding legal effect to the express or implied
intent of Congress that commerce in hazardous waste" be unconstrained
in certain ways. Even a judicially inferred intent on the part of Congress
to let the proverbial chips fall where they may amounts to a policy
adopted, if only by default, by Congress. As such, an inferred con-
gressional policy may amount to state action 47 triggering equal protec-
tion rights." In practice, of course, Congress has taken an active role
in the general question of hazardous waste disposal siting and opera-.
tion.49
Clearly, not every geographic pattern of distribution of hazardous
waste disposal sites amounts to a violation of anyone's equal protection
rights. But at least in extreme instances, this problem may arise. It
would not be startling if the most active hazardous waste disposal
facilities were concentrated, not merely in sparsely populated areas, but
44. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
45. For a general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv.
873, 886-88 (1987). It may well be the case that landfill space is at a premium in some states, see
Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 748 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (Bayh
I), or that "the market may not support a site in every state," Campbell, supra note 12, at 187.
But these facts may not be utterly unaffected by state governmental policies intentionally or
inadvertently helping to preserve them or bring them about. A state-imposed tax, inspection fee,
or zoning requirement obviously may affect the market viability of hazardous waste sites within
that state.
46. For brief discussions of hazardous waste as qualifying as an item of commerce, see
National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't Envtl. Mgmt., 910 F.2d 713, 718-19 (1 lth
Cir. 1990), modfled on denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (1991); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683
F.2d 206, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1982); Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 1978).
47. For a sense of how congressional responsibility for a given state of affairs may amount
to state action, even if that responsibility is shared with private actors, see R. George Wright,
State Action and State Responsibility, 23 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 685, 689-90 (1989).
48. For a discussion of federal, as opposed to state, liability for what amounts to an equal
protection violation, see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
49. See supra note 3. Congress, of course, retains plenary power to redress any sort of state
discrimination in the commercial area. See Sedler, supra note 26, at 1025. Congress has not yet
exercised that power in any clear, systematic fashion in the hazardous waste site context. See
Bayh I1, 753 F. Supp. at 743.
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in relatively poor areas unable to effectively exercise political power in
their own interests. The matter of race will be taken up separately in
the section following.
Any community that correctly believes that it has become, either
through intention or inadvertence, the "dumping ground" for a broader
region or the entire nation naturally incurs a stigmatic or dignitary
injury. 0 Whether intentional or not, the injury may reflect a lack of
respect and may tend to undermine the bases of the self-respect of the
adversely affected community.5 If a locality is chosen for uncompen-
sated victimization as the designated dumping ground for unwanted,
potentially dangerous waste products, there may, in extreme cases, be
at work relations of political domination, of subordination, of center
and periphery, and of dependency most familiarly described in the
literature on economic imperialism.5 2
Should the Commerce Clause nevertheless control over the Equal
Protection Clause in such cases? Perhaps the Commerce Clause, with
its emphasis on the free flow of goods and services among states
without artificial barriers and restrictions, contemplates such unfortu-
nate outcomes as those referred to above. The Commerce Clause, in
effect, would amount to a warning to all localities to ensure, through
their own economic development, that the most economically valuable
use of their land is not as a hazardous waste site.
The best response to this objection is that the Commerce Clause does
not clearly and unequivocally command such results. In fact, the logic
of the purposes and values53 of the Commerce Clause to a substantial
degree runs counter to the sacrifice of one or a few localities as the
stigmatized victims of the market in hazardous waste. It is not clear
that a state or locality that genuinely seeks to avoid the stigmatic injury
50. See supra notes 37-42 & accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 41-42 & accompanying text.
52. For a brief discussion of the relationships between and among respect, self-respect,
dependence, and domination, see Telfer, supra note 42, at 114-17. For a sampling of some of
the relevant literature of economic imperialism, see DAVID BECKER ET AL., POsTnIpERIALIsM:
INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND DEvELoPmENT IN THE LATE TwEwrmm CENTURY (1987); ANTHoNY
BRE ER, MARXIST THEORIES oF IMPERIALISu: A CuIcAL SuRVEY (1980); BENJAMIN CoHEN, THE
QuESTION OF IMPERIALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OP DOMINANCE AND DEPENDENCE (1973);
NORMAN ETHERINUTON, THEoRIEs OF IMPERLALmM: WAR, CONQUEST AND CAPrrAL (1984); ImPERI-
ALIsm (Philip D. Curtin ed., 1971); THm IMPERIALISM READER (Louis Snyder ed. 1962); JOsEPH
ALOIS SCHUMPETER, IMPERIALISM SOCL CLASSES (Heinz Norden trans., 1951); ALBERT SZYMANSKI,
THE Looic oF IMP ALISM (1981).
53. For a recent judicial statement of the premise that the Commerce Clause was intended
to serve some discrete set of purposes or values, see Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388,
399 (3d Cir. 1987).
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of becoming a dumping ground for the region or nation is repudiating
the purposes of the Commerce Clause.
It is commonly said, for example, that the Commerce Clause is aimed
at preventing the states from engaging in economic isolationism,5 from
dodging their responsibility for contributing to national economic goals, 5"
or from refusing to contribute their fair share to such ends. 56 The
Commerce Clause is said to require that commerce in even undesirable
goods be a two-way street, 57 and that the states display solidarity in
this regard. 58 Perhaps most importantly, each state must recognize the
significance of national economic and political unity, as opposed to
hostility and division, 59 and not arbitrarily6° restrict the inflow of
hazardous waste merely because such waste was generated out of state.6'
In the context of a community genuinely seeking to avoid the un-
compensated stigmatic or dignitary injury of long-term service as the
region or nation's hazardous trash receptacle, each of these purposes
or values underlying the Commerce Clause is at the very least equivocal.
To reject such victimization is precisely to argue for burden-sharing, a
two-way street in commerce, fairness of shares, a sense of unity,
commonality of status, solidarity, mutual responsibility, and national
unity. Far from obvious is why a process that results in uncompensated
stigmatized victims necessarily optimizes, over the long term, unity and
solidarity.
54. See, e.g., id.; Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, Ga., 731 F. Supp. 505, 508
(M.D. Ga. 1990); Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL.
L. REv. 1203, 1235 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir.
1985).
56. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 1, at 548.
57. See Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 780 (S.D. Ind.
1990) (Bayh I1).
58. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949), quoted in Government
Suppliers Consol. Servs. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853, 865 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (Bayh 1).
59. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935); Bayh II, 753 F.
Supp. at 763; Richard B. Collins, Economic Union As a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 43, 43-46 (1988); Pomper, supra note 13, at 1323; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 McH. L. REv.
1091, 1113 (1986) ("State protectionism is unacceptable because it is inconsistent with the very
idea of political union, even a limited federal union. Protectionist legislation is the economic
equivalent of war. It is hostile in its essence."); Smith, supra note 54, at 1206.
60. See Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1982).
61. See id. at 213; Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, Ga., 731 F. Supp. 505, 508
(M.D. Ga. 1990); Industrial Maintenance Serv., Inc. v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436, 443 (S.D. W.
Va. 1987) (no significant difference in threat posed by out-of-state as opposed to in-state asbestos);
Regan, supra note 59, at 1094-95; Sedler, supra note 26, at 894.
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It is still possible, though, to interpret the Commerce Clause as
mandating a laissez-faire vision of free trade,6 or as enacting the
market-driven vision of Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.61 But laissez-
faire would seem an odd approach to the development of national
solidarity,6 and on the basis of the above considerations, it seems
doubtful that the Commerce Clause is most coherently read as enshrin-
ing laissez-faire generally. 65 At least in the stigmatic-injury cases, the
Commerce Clause does not mandate laissez-faire in the disposal of
hazardous wastes."
It is then possible to argue, however, that in any case in which
victimization or the disproportionate burdening of one locality is in-
volved, that community can be compensated, thereby leaving the siting
process itself, and the requirement of non-discriminatory acceptance of
out-of-state hazardous waste, intact. 67 The promise of fair compensa-
tion, however, is invariably deeply problematic.
Doubtless, it is possible in theory to imagine a private hazardous
waste site developer offering a wide-ranging compensation package to
adjoining landowners for depressed land values," to the local munici-
pality for increased infrastructure costs,69 and to local citizens for
potential health and environmental risks. 70 Offers of compensation,
however, have usually proven unsuccessful in overcoming opposition to
the siting of hazardous waste facilities. 71 In some cases, offers of
compensation have only enhanced local opposition to such sites. 72
This result should not be surprising. Offers of compensation may
merely enhance suspicions of the dangers or risks at stake, and in any
case, the size of the compensation package is likely to be inadequate
62. See, e.g., DuMond, 336 U.S. at 539; see also Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125, 130-31 (discussing the logic of DuMond in this respect).
63. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (repudiating
notion that the Due Process Clause mandates the laissez-faire economics of Herbert Spencer).
64. See Collins, supra note 59, at 63-64 (recognizing possible tensions between laissez-faire
economics and solidaristic burden-sharing).
65. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 434-35 (1982) ("There was no intent ... to inject a philosophy of laissez-faire into the
constitutional fabric.").
66. Cf. Tarlock, supra note 25, at 149 (finding it "doubtful" that the Constitution mandates
a state's acceptance of out-of-state wastes).
67. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 275-76.
68. See id. at 276; Delogu, supra note 1, at 215; Farkas, supra note 1, at 458-59.
69. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 276; Delogu, supra note 1, at 215.
70. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 276.
71. See Farkas, supra note 1, at 458-59.
72. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 276-77.
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from the standpoint of local citizens.73 Many people will resist any
explicit calculation of a dollar equivalent of an enhanced personal safety
risk. 74 Worse, there may, in some cases, be an unconscious tendency
to undervalue the interests of the typically rural, poor, minority, and
politically powerless people affected.
Finally, and most important in this context, stigmatic or dignitary
injuries may, by their Very nature, in some sense not be susceptible of
compensation. This is not merely because dignitary or stigmatic injuries
are intangible, subjective, and difficult to quantify,75 or because it may
be difficult to arrive at a community consensus on the proper amount. 76
Rather, it is chiefly because a stigmatic injury of the kind discussed in
this article remains largely unaffected by any imaginable payment
arrangements.
If it is degrading, or a badge of low hierarchical status, for a
community to be intentionally or inadvertently assigned the role of
hazardous waste dump for a nation, it remains such even if that
community is being compensated to assume that status. The character
of the stigma may remain essentially constant, whether the stigmatized
community receives lesser or greater financial benefit. Attempting to
compensate for imposing a degrading status on a community is thus,
in some sense, self-defeating. In the eyes of some, paradoxically,
payment for assuming a degrading status only worsens the stigmatic
injury.
The best solution for the problem of stigmatizing a few politically
defenseless communities is to spread the in-kind burden of the disposal
of hazardous waste much more broadly, among a far greater number
and greater variety of communities." This solution is not optimal from
a narrowly pecuniary, short-term perspective. But spreading the actual
disposal among a larger number and variety of technically suitable
localities would reduce stigmatic injuries and ultimately contribute to a
genuine sense of unity, national solidarity, and the equitable sharing
of burdens contemplated not only by the Equal Protection Clause, 78
73. See Brion, supra note 1, at 497.
74. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 276.
75. See Brion, supra note 1, at 497.
76. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 277.
77. There is some precedent for this approach, at least at the state level. See Tarlock, supra
note 1, at 561 (citing Michigan's geographical distribution requirement embodied in MiCH. Com.
LAws Am. § 299.509(2)(a)-(3)(c) (West 1980)); see also supra note 2.
78. Some of the arguments advanced in this article under the rubric of the Equal Protection
Clause could also be advanced under the rubric of the Article IV, Section 2 Privileges and
Immunities Clause. It has been argued, for example, that "article IV's privileges and immunities
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but by the Commerce Clause itself. If the threat of this enforced sharing
leads to political pressure for less production of hazardous waste, or
to increased treatment of hazardous wastes to reduce their toxicity, or
to safer landfills, so much the better.
IV. HAzARDous WASTE DISPOSAL, RACIAL VICTIMIzATION, AND THE
SCOPE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Hazardous waste disposal facilities are not usually sited in commu-
nities that possess the political ability to successfully resist such siting. 79
Not surprisingly, affluent and economically modest communities differ
in their abilities to fend off hazardous waste facility construction, 0 to
the prejudice, typically, of the relatively poor."'
Even systematic victimization of the relatively poor, however, is not
subject to particularly intensive judicial scrutiny. 2 But the uncompen-
sated burdens of hazardous waste disposal facility siting nationally do
not fall merely upon the poor. The best available evidence indicates
with some clarity that such burdens systematically and disproportion-
ately fall upon racial minorities as such. 83
Assuming, for the moment, that such otherwise inexplicable dispro-
portionate burdening of racial minorities can be shown to exist, the
governmental interest in providing some sort of redress should be strong.
clause can be construed to prohibit the states from discriminating against the citizens of other
states who engage in commerce." Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 617. In the most
important instances, however, recasting an equal protection argument, or even an argument under
the Commerce Clause itself, into a privileges and immunities claim would be either impossible or
not distinctively helpful. For those interested in exploring the possibilities of the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause, two points should be borne in mind. First, corporations cannot,
as noncitizens, make claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1868); see Campbell, supra note 12, at 194; Eule, supra note 65, at 449-54; Sedler,
supra note 26, at 1004. Second, and more interesting, while Congress can freely preempt or
reverse judicial declarations as to what the dormant Commerce Clause permits and prohibits, it
is not at all clear that Congress has a like power to overrule judicial holdings as to the requirements
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 195-96 n.86.
79. See Andreen, supra note 1, at 814.
80. See Brion, supra note 1, at 440, 498.
81. See id.
82. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973). Regardless,
some have argued that legislative or political underrepresentation of particular groups should elicit
protective judicial responses. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 25, at 171 (citing JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DisTusT: A THEoRY OF JUDicIL REviEw (1980)); Cf. Anson & Schenkkan,
supra note 25, at 83-84; Tushnet, supra note 62, at 130-41 (discussing judicial concern for
inadequacies in the legislative-electoral representative process in the context of the Commerce
Clause).
83. See infra notes 97-103 & accompanying text.
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The governmental interest in enhancing the diversity of broadcasting
licenseholders, particularly along racial lines, was rightly characterized
as important by the Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.84 The
governmental interest in spreading the benefits of broadcast licenses is
plainly not significantly greater than the interest in more equitably
spreading the burdens of hazardous waste disposal sites. As well, the
potential for the sort of stigmatic injury discussed in Section III above
can only be heightened when the community involved is one with a
high percentage of racial and ethnic minority residents.
In addition, governments do not merely control the siting process.
Governments, and the federal government in particular, are among the
leading generators of the hazardous wastes, the burdens of which are
racially maldistributed. 85 If there is detectable unfairness in the ultimate
distribution of the risks and costs of hazardous waste disposal sites,
particularly along racial lines, governmental responsibility is profound
and inescapable.8
The crucial question, then, would seem to be whether, or to what
extent, a detectable, systematic pattern of racial bias inheres in the
national distribution of hazardous waste disposal facilities. Casual
consideration of isolated cases by itself raises a certain degree of
suspicion. Of course, isolated cases cannot be conclusive, or establish
patterns, but their very concreteness may be instructive.
As it turns out, the nation's largest single hazardous waste disposal
facility is the Emelle site in Sumter County, Alabama.Y Census figures
do not present an encouraging picture of Sumter County in any obvious
respect. In 1980, labor force participation among males over the age
of sixteen stood at 59.6%.88 For every 100 workers in Sumter County,
84. 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3027-28 (1990).
85. See National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dept. Envtl. Mgmt., 729 F. Supp.
792, 797 (N.D. Ala.) (observing that the nation's largest hazardous waste landfill, located at
Emelle, Alabama, accepts toxic wastes from, among other sources, "159 military bases and other
federal agencies") rev'd on other grounds, 910 F.2d 713 (1990), modified on denial of reh'g, 924
F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
86. Governments cannot minimize their responsibility simply by failing to approve new
hazardous waste disposal facilities at a rate commensurate with the need for such space. Failing
to approve new legitimate sites simply increases the rate of illegal, more dangerous disposal of
hazardous waste. See Andreen, supra note 1, at 814; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 1, at 267;
Delogu, supra note 1, at 200-01. Whether the illegal dumping of hazardous waste occurs with a
less disproportionate racial impact than the legal disposal of such wastes may be subject to doubt.
87. See National Solid Wastes, 729 F. Supp. at 797. For further discussion of the Emelle
facility, see generally State v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 538 (1989).
88. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CO RCE, 1980 Census of Population, General
Social Economic Characteristics, Alabama, at 2-18, tbl. 57 [hereinafter 1980 Census].
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there were 188 nonworkers.89 The percentage of families with no workers
stood at 21.57. 90 Median household income in Sumter County was
$9,185 per year,91 with per capita income at $4,383. 92 The percentage
of families below the government-established poverty line was 28.7076. 93
It should be emphasized that these figures do not reflect the possible
economic benefits associated with the genuinely long-term operation of
the waste disposal facility; the facility was only beginning operation at
roughly the time of the Census. 94 The above figures may, however, be
unfortunately relevant to explaining the choice of Emelle as the location
of the facility. Crucial for the immediate purposes is the racial com-
position of the county at the time of siting. Of a total Sumter County
population of approximately 16,900, 11,711 persons, or approximately
two-thirds, listed themselves as black. 95 This racial composition is
unusual among Alabama counties. 96
Of course, a single instance, even an unusually important single
instance, of a dramatic racial impact in the hazardous waste facility
siting process does not establish any intended or unintended pattern.
By way of a homely analogy, we would be reluctant to conclude that
a particular coin is "biased" or "unfair" if heads turned up, say, three
times in a row. After all, three heads in a row would be expected about
once in eight trials, or about 1207o of the time, with an unimpeachably
fair coin.
Vivid individual examples, then, have their place. But for anything
approaching a definitive test of the racial fairness of the hazardous
waste siting process, we must, in the absence of outright admissions of
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. The Emetie facility was granted interim status authorization, with endorsement of the
State of Alabama, in November of 1980. See Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1553 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied. 110 S. Ct. 538 (1989). The facility began operation in 1977. See DR. BENJAMIN F.
C-Avis & CHARLES LEE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT
ON THE RACIAL AND SocIo-EcoNOpac CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAzARDOUs WASTE
SITES, tbl. B-10 (1987).
95. See 1980 Census, supra note 88, at 2-28, tbl. 58. After at least six years of authorized
operation of the Emelle facility, the estimated Sumter County population had decreased slightly
to 16,100. See 1990 Alabama Legal Directory 320. Again, this does not in itself suggest that the
net economic impact of the facility has been negative; the trends might conceivably have been
worse but for the employment opportunities afforded by the facility.
96. See 1980 Census, supra note 88, at 2-28, tbl. 58. For the record, in Sumter County at
the time of the 1980 Census, black persons were approximately seven times as likely as white
persons to be below 75% of the government-established poverty level. See id. at 2-493, tbl. 187.
Approximately one-third of black persons in Sumter County fell into that category. See id.
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racial animus from the relevant officials, consider a larger number of
cases or trials. To continue the analogy, seven consecutive heads occurs
by chance with a fair coin less than one percent of the time. Beyond
a certain point, the logic of probability begins to suggest that the
hypothesis of fairness is naive or disingenuous.
According to the best available evidence, that point has been reached
in the hazardous waste facility siting process. Of the communities
surrounding the nation's five largest landfills accepting hazardous waste,
the percentage of minority population is more than three times the
national average. 97 A GAO study of four landfills in the southeastern
United States found a majority black population in three of the four
communities .
Of course, however apparently striking the results, the number of
"trials" in such an analysis is still small. We can increase the number
of trials by considering other vaguely related indicia of disproportionate
racial impact in connection with other sorts of hazardous waste facilities.
If the focus is expanded to cover commercial hazardous waste facilities
generally, whether they involve the treatment, storage, or disposal of
such wastes, the racial pattern remains. For example, among commu-
nities nationally with one such facility, the racial and ethnic minority
population percentage was twice that of communities without suchfacilities. 99
The number of "trials" involved, however, might be said to be
irrelevant if any apparent racial burdening is merely an artifact of other
considerations, such as socioeconomic status or urban versus rural
residence. Perhaps there is no legally cognizable racial invidiousness in
siting facilities, in part, in accordance with wealth and poverty, or
urban versus rural status, even if these dimensions are correlated with
race. The Supreme Court has, in other contexts, accepted analogous
arguments, though not without dissent. °0
On the evidence, however, race does matter independently of socio-
economic status or the rural-urban dimension. It has been concluded,
on the basis of broad consideration of hazardous waste facilities of
97. See Charles Lee, The Racist Disposal of Toxic Wastes, Bus. & Soc'Y Rav., Summer
1987, at 43, 45 [hereinafter Lee]. The conclusions conveniently summarized in this article are
documented and elaborated in a larger study, CtAvis & LEE, supra note 94.
98. See Lee, supra note 97, at 43-44.
99. See id. at 45.
100. See generally the opinions of Justice Stevens for the Court and Justice White in dissent
on the problem of how to respond judicially to a substantial overlap between suspect and non-
suspect classifications in New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-94, 602-11
(1979).
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various types, that race is in fact the most significant variable. I0°
Specifically, "[a]lthough socioeconomic status appeared to play an
important role in the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities,
race still proved to be more significant. This remained true after the
study controlled for urbanization and regional differences." ' 0 2
It might still be asked, in the face of all of this directly and indirectly
related evidence, whether it is reasonable to suppose that disparities in
the racial impact of hazardous waste disposal facility siting could still
be due to chance. All that can be said on this score, however, is that
the various national findings referred to above would occur by chance"with a probability of less than 1 in 10,000.'"103 We do not normally
guide our lives by betting on one in ten thousand chances.
Some persons may, however, still be suspicious of mere statistics,
even if the statistics or probabilities can be deemed conclusive to a
moral certainty. It is appropriate to ask in response, though, what
other reasonably obtainable evidence would suffice to establish elements
of racial discrimination in the hazardous waste disposal facility siting
process. The decentralized nature of the siting process is such that no
single person or group of persons contributes to more than a few siting
decisions.' 4 It is thus impossible for any set of decisionmakers to admit
personally to a pattern of discrimination. Given the typically uncon-
scious or rationalized character of much racial discrimination, 10 it is
unlikely that even an admission of discrimination regarding any indi-
vidual site will be forthcoming.
The general unavailability of any admissions of conscious, intended
racial discrimination in the siting process, then, requires us to choose
between relying on the best available statistical evidence, or ignoring
the problem of racial discrimination as insufficiently documented. To
press the coin-tossing analogy, it is as though we were interested in the
fairness or unfairness of a coin, but were unable, for practical reasons,
to "directly" investigate the fairness of the coin. Even if we could not
directly examine, say, whether one side of the coin was curved, or was
heavier than the other, we would not hesitate to pronounce the coin
unfair through an "indirect" examination. Specifically, if we tossed
101. See Lee, supra note 97, at 45.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 45-46.
104. The twenty-seven communities with the largest commercial hazardous waste landfills are
found in sixteen different states, with some facilities beginning operation a quarter century before
others. See CiAvis & LEE, supra note 94.
105. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rv. 317, 339-44 (1987).
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the coin enough times, and obtained a sufficiently distinctive count of
heads and tails, so that we could say that the observed disparity between
heads and tails could occur only one in ten thousand times, we would
likely surrender our agnosticism, and conclude that the coin is, in all
likelihood, unfair.
The Supreme Court, however, has taken a somewhat more fastidious
approach to certain cases. In racial discrimination cases, as it were, we
must be concerned not merely with the fairness of the coin, but with
whether the coin was, by design, intended to be unfair. Thus discrim-
inatory intent, beyond discriminatory impact, must be proved to estab-
lish an equal protection violation.106
It remains true, though, that to some degree, intent to discriminate
may be inferred from racially disproportionate consequences. As the
Court has observed:
[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true,
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also
not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact ... may for
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in
various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain
on nonracial grounds.'07
The Supreme Count has, however, occasionally been reluctant to
infer the requisite discriminatory intent from an overall pattern of
effects generated by multiple, uncoordinated decisions. In McCleskey
v. Kemp,'°8 for example, a black petitioner who received the death
penalty for killing a white police officer during a store robbery chal-
lenged the capital sentencing process as racially discriminatory in prac-
tice. The petitioner relied on a large and technically sophisticated study
concluding, among other things, that at the relevant times, black
defendants convicted of killing white victims were disproportionately
likely to receive the death penalty.1°9
106. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976). For arguments that
disproportionate burdening of racial minorities should, on that basis alone, receive more vigorous
judicial scrutiny than the Court seems inclined to accord, see Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HAv. L. REv. 1, 50-52 & n.287 (1977); Michael
J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Reappraisal, 79 COLuM. L. REv.
1023, 1040-41 (1979).
107. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242; see also id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Frequently
the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather
than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor.... This is particularly true
in the case of... compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation.").
108. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
109. Id. at 286-87.
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The Court, however, concluded that the study in question, apart
from further evidence specific to the petitioner's own case, did not
establish an equal protection violation." 0 While rejecting the petitioner's
claim, the Court reiterated its prior rule that "statistical proof normally
must present a 'stark' pattern to be accepted as the sole proof of
discriminatory intent under the Constitution.""'
It would not be unreasonable to distinguish the study in McCleskey
from those in the hazardous waste facility area on grounds of "stark-
ness." This is not at all to impeach the death penalty studies. One can,
however, argue that their magnitude and clarity of results do not equal
that of the hazardous waste studies.
The death penalty studies indicate that when controlling for thirty-
nine nonracial variables, "defendants charged with killing white victims
were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants
charged with killing blacks."" 2 Less starkness is apparent, however, at
the general level of the race of the defendant. At the level of raw
numbers, "4% of the black defendants received the death penalty, as
opposed to 7% of the white defendants.""'  Of course, raw numbers
may mask systematic injustices against minorities in the sentencing
process: When a number of nonracial variables were controlled for,
"black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence
as other defendants.""l 4
It is thus reasonable to conclude that the racial disproportionality is
starker in the hazardous waste area than in the death penalty area."5
Again, this is not to defend the result in McCleskey, or the Court's
dismissal of the death penalty studies. Neither is ultimately defensible.
But if the Court continues to insist on starkness, the hazardous waste
results are evidently starker.
The Court has expressed some concern about exclusive reliance upon
statistical evidence, however apparently conclusive, where the party
against whom the statistical case is built has no opportunity to rebut
the evidence of discrimination by explaining the statistical disparity." 6
110. Id. at 291-99.
Ill. Id. at 293. A somewhat less demanding standard has been adopted in certain other
contexts, such as jury selection and Title VII civil rights claims. See id. at 293-94.
112. Id. at 287.
113. Id. at 286.
114. Id. at 287.
115. It might also be noted that above a certain level of aggravation of circumstances associated
with the killing, the racial effects are apparently washed away. See id. n.5. It is not clear that
there are any such comparable ranges of cases in the hazardous waste area.
116. See id. at 296.
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Doubtless statistical evidence should not be treated as sacrosanct." 7 But
insisting upon an opportunity for the relevant decisionmakers to attempt
to rebut the statistical evidence is, in the hazardous waste context, not
incompatible with a trial on the merits of the equal protection claim.
There should be no confusion, though, about what form that rebuttal
evidence must take. In the hazardous waste context, the statistical
evidence cannot be rebutted merely by the testimony of hundreds of
individual, independent decisionmakers to the effect that each acted
without racial animus. The point of the statistical evidence is to show
that regardless of all those independent subjective beliefs, the aggregate
result is simply unexplainable on any rational basis not taking race into
consideration as a major element. The statistical evidence itself must
be rebutted, perhaps as technically flawed or equivocal, or as compatible
with a plausible alternative nonracial interpretation.
This discussion has not exhausted the relevant differences between
statistical evidence of disproportionate racial impact in the death penalty
context and the hazardous waste site context. There is a sense, for
example, in which for McCleskey to prevail, he must show racial
discrimination in his individual case, rather than a statistical tendency
toward racial discrimination over a run of cases. But the argument in
the hazardous waste context need not focus on any particular siting
case. The essence of the equal protection violation in the hazardous
waste context is the overall pattern of distribution. That pattern can
be rectified, at least prospectively, without accusing any particular
decisionmaker in any particular case of conscious or unconscious racism.
The decision in a hazardous waste siting case is always racial in a
sense in which a capital punishment case need not be. The actual choice
in any capital case is never in and of itself racially comparative. It is
instead a matter of whether this particular defendant, of a particular
race, should, under these circumstances, be condemned or not. In
contrast, the hazardous waste siting decision is typically, if not invari-
ably, at least implicitly racial. Potential sites differ as to their racial
composition. Among the minimally technically qualified potential sites,
should a site with a greater, or lesser, minority population be chosen?
Further, one might argue that while there is inevitably broad discre-
tion in the criminal conviction and capital sentencing context, the
criminal process has been hedged about by procedural safeguards to
make the process as fair as possible." 8 Whatever the strength of this
117. See generally Laurence Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
118. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
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contention, the hazardous waste facility siting process, however open,
public, and democratic, is not constrained to the same degree by
procedural safeguards intended specifically to ensure that racial and
ethnic minorities are not disproportionately burdened in particular cases
or in the-aggregate.
Finally, it may be possible that the McCleskey Court was fearful
that accepting the statistical evidence in that case would inevitably
undermine all capital punishment in the State of Georgia." 9 From the
perspective of the Court majority, this would presumably be an unde-
sirable consequence. The equal protection argument in the hazardous
waste siting process context, however, offers no comparable undesirable
outcome. Hazardous waste will inevitably be disposed of, legally or
illegally. This article has argued that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the overall net burdens of such disposal not fall dispro-
portionately upon racial minorities. To the extent that non-minority
communities perceive that the chances that hazardous waste may be
disposed of in their own communities would be increased under such
a rule, there may be desirable consequences. Among these might be at
least minimally enhanced public pressure to develop cost-effective ways
of reducing the volume and toxicity of hazardous wastes, perhaps along
with improved containment systems.
V. CONCLUSION
The most important effects of hazardous waste disposal facility siting
decisions should not escape serious judicial scrutiny merely because
those siting decisions are made in a decentralized fashion by a shifting
mix of governmental decisionmakers. Federal and state governments
should not be permitted to evade responsibility merely because a number
of independent governmental and private actors have some role in the
siting process.
In particular, relief under the Equal Protection Clause may be
appropriate in extreme cases when communities or states are asked to
bear uncompensated net burdens of such a nature and magnitude that
the community or state suffers stigmatic injury. Relief in such cases,
perhaps in the form of requiring an increase in the number and
dispersion of disposal sites, would not only comply with the dormant
Commerce Clause, but would in fact materially advance the clause's
underlying purposes.
119. See id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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More clearly, equal protection-based relief should be available in
appropriate cases where the overall distribution of hazardous waste
sites cannot rationally be explained except, in substantial part, upon
the basis of the racial or ethnic minority composition of the communities
most directly affected. In principle, statistical evidence may be sufficient
to establish the necessary discriminatory intent of the governmental
defendants. Generally, the relief involved will be injunctive and pro-
spective, broadly requiring greater numbers and a greater variety of
communities among the sites actually selected from all those prospective
sites meeting minimal technical criteria. As the number and variety of
communities bearing some responsibility for the disposal of hazardous
wastes increases, any stigmatic injury associated with such communities
may be reduced, along with a more direct reduction in the dispropor-
tionate racial burdening currently evident.
